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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to investigate how labor market institutions and 
regulations and tax policies effect income inequality across the European member 
countries. The sample contains the fifteen core European Union (EU) members as 
well  as  thirteen  Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEE)  economies  which  have 
recently  joined.  Using  fixed  and  random  effect  panel  models  over  the  sample 
period 2000–2011 we test the influence of three major tax forms (labor, capital and 
consumption),  social  security  contributions,  and  labor  market  institutions.  We 
demonstrate  that  the  overall  social  contributions  and  labor  taxes  lead  to 
statistically  significant  improvements  in  income  inequality  among  EU  member 
states. We conclude that tax policy, specifically the choice of taxes implemented, 
and  labor  market  institutions,  union  membership  in  particular,  reduce  income 
inequality in the EU-28 in the observed period.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss and analyze the effects labor market institutions and tax 
policies  have  on  income  inequality  across  the  European  Union  which  includes 
Croatia  as  its  newest  member. We  consider  income  inequality  in  the  European 
Union  during  the  process  of  enlargement  because  inequality  across  member 
countries  is  driven  by  structural  differences  across  the  fifteen  “core”  EU15 
economies  and  the  thirteen  new  member  states  (EU13)  which  make  up  the 
European Union (EU). Special attention is paid to discussing income inequality in 
Croatia. Questions regarding income inequality, such as redistributive role of taxes, 
transfers and other expenditure policies will also be discussed. Overall, we consider 
the EU economies as a whole but elaborate on the differences between the new and 
the old member states because of heterogeneous levels of development and policy 
across the EU. 
Contemporary  labor  economics  is  increasingly  concerned  with  the  issue  of 
labor  institutions/regulations  impact  on  markets  and  economic  outcomes.  The 
overarching goal of labor market policies is income redistribution, therefore, it can 
be an effective at reducing income inequality. Labor market institutions include:   
(1) social protection systems (programs and unemployment benefits, early retirement 
system, and various social forms of income support); (2) different aspects of labor 
legislation  (law  on  minimum  wages,  employment  protection  legislation  and  the 
enforcement of the legislation); (3) the implementation of active labor market policies, 
and (4) participation in trade unions and collective bargaining. One concentration of 
this paper is the role labor market policies (active and passive one) and union power 
have on inequality.
While wage and salary differentials are standard contributors to income inequality, 
transfer  payments,  taxes,  and  social  security  contributions  play  a  role  in 
counteracting it. Similarly, fiscal authorities use progressive taxation to distribute 
income more equally. Limits of the effectiveness of such policies depend on how 
individuals and firms respond to changes in relative prices and other elasticities. 
This  paper  presents  a  hypothesis  that  implementation  of  selected  labor  market 
institutions/regulations  and  fiscal  measures  influence  inequality  reduction. 
Additionally, determinants of social security contributions, labor market institutions 
(participation in trade unions and labor market policies), education and three major 
tax  forms  (labor,  capital  and  consumption)  as  well  as  other  relevant  measures 
related to tax policy will be tested.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the extant 
literature on the determinants of inequality in developed and transition countries; 
Section  3  presents  used  methodology  and  comparative  evidence  on  inequality 
trends and highlights examples in which labor market and fiscal policy are used to Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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reduce inequality in European Union member states. This section also elaborates 
causes of rising income inequality in Croatia. In Section 4 we discuss the data used 
and summarize the empirical strategy and in Section 5 we present our main results 
and discuss them. Section 6 gives some concluding recommendations.
2. Literature review
While, defining income inequality from an economic perspective is relatively easy 
and is frequently used as an indicator of relative poverty or prosperity and as an 
argument  for  income  redistribution  policies,  the  difficulty  lies  in  understanding 
its  origins.  Previous  studies,  put  the  emphasis  on  family  structure,  technology, 
globalized  markets,  immigration,  property  rights  or  trade.  Others  focus  on  the 
regulatory  reforms  and  institutional  changes  and  show  the  effects  achieved 
with these measures are contradictory. On one hand, they increase employment 
possibilities, however, regulations can also contribute to wider wage disparities.
Globalization is frequently cited as a leading cause for rising income inequality, 
though questions arise on how this occurs. Some studies, e.g. Jaumotte et al. (2008), 
find  that  rising  imports  from  developing  countries  influence  income  inequality 
reduction  in  advanced  countries.  Others  find  that  increased  trade  integration  is 
responsible for increased income inequality in both high and low-wage countries as 
in Milanovic and Squire (2005). Krugman (2007) and Scheve and Slaughter (2007) 
suggest that globalization has a significant impact on income distribution in the 
United States mainly due to trade, foreign direct investment and offshore activities. 
The  new  financial  crisis  made  these  inequalities  worse  in  innumerable  ways, 
beyond the higher unemployment, lost homes, stagnating wages (Stiglitz, 2012: 3).
Other  studies  stress  technological  progress  as  an  important  catalyst  in  widening 
income  inequality.  The  role  played  by  technology  in  raising  inequality  is 
straightforward: technological progress changes the type of labor demanded in the 
labor market and creates jobs previously non-existent, shifting labor demand from low 
to high skilled labor. It should be noted the use of technology reduces consumption 
good’s prices which may improve the welfare of lower income households.
Studies which examine the role of education in income inequality have proven the 
importance of “up-skilling” the labor force, such as Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992), 
Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) and Zhang (1996). Karaman Aksentijević et al. (2006) 
identify education as the most influential area of economic and social policy which 
reduces poverty and economic inequality in Croatia over the long term.
Next we explore how the effects of tax and transfer policies on income inequality 
and elaborate differences on the extent of redistribution in developed and transition 
countries. We use Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) argument that the median voter’s Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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interest in redistribution will be greater in more unequal societies as a starting point 
of our investigation. Several papers have already tested this hypothesis (Milanovic, 
2000; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; de Mello and Tiongson, 2006; Lupu and 
Pontusson, 2011) and come to various conclusions. An earlier theory from Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) and and Persson and Tabellini (1994) demonstrate that countries 
with more income inequality are more likely to suffer from political instability. 
Similar theories have been earlier developed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994). It is also very intriguing how Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) highlight countries with more income inequality are more likely to suffer 
from political instability.
Studies confirm that public cash transfers (as for example passive labor market 
policies),  as  well  as  income  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  played  a 
major  role  in  reducing  market-income  inequality.  Estimates  using  the  working-
age population show an average reduction in income equality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient, of about 25% across OECD countries (OECD, 2011: 36). The 
final quarter of the past century experienced an increase in annual working time 
of production workers not only in the US but in Sweden as well (Bowles, 2012: 
162).  In  OECD  countries  the  Gini  coefficient  averaged  0.29  in  the  mid-1980s. 
By the late 2000s, however, it had increased by roughly 10% to 0.32, rising in 
17 of the 22 OECD countries (OECD, 2011: 22). Different measures for Croatia, 
Gini coefficients (separately measured for employed, retirees, small business and 
taxpayers) calculated by Sever and Drezgić (2003) were between 0.38 and 0.41 
over the period 1995 to 2001. They conclude that the overall values of the total Gini 
coefficients are very high what characterizes societies of typical liberal capitalism 
and  confirm  that  the  previous  Croatian  fiscal  and  tax  system  increased  income 
inequalities. 
There  are  only  a  few  empirical  studies  on  the  determinants  of  inequality  in 
transition countries. Mitra and Yemetsov (2006) illustrate how the liberalization 
of  capital,  goods  and  services,  labor  markets,  privatization  of  state-owned 
enterprises and establishment of new institutions lead to a heterogeneous increase 
in  inequality  across  transition  economies.  They  find  that  the  republics  of  the 
former Soviet Union, not including the three Baltic republics, endured a rapid 
rise in inequality, whereas the EU13 experienced a smaller and more gradual 
increase in inequality. Giammatteo (2006) argues that the redistribution policies 
allowed  governments  to  contain  rising  inequality  during  the  transition  period. 
Nestić  (2002)  concludes  that  changes  in  inequality  in  Croatia  between  1973-
1998 were mild due to an expansion of social transfers and the absence of major 
wage increases. Šućur (2011) looks at the impact of pensions and other social 
contributions on gross and disposable income inequality in Croatia during the 
period 2001–2009 and demonstrates that the inequality reduction effects of state 
transfers were not as effective as expected.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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Changes in labor market institutions, policies and regulations in general are negatively 
correlated, albeit very modestly in most cases, with changes in wage dispersion within 
countries. Milanovic (1999) argues that the observed increase in inequality in transition 
countries is driven mainly by higher inequality in wage distribution. Galbraith (2012) 
shows that more equal societies systematically enjoy lower unemployment. Keane 
and Prasad (2002) also find that the reallocation of workers from the public sector 
with a compressed wage distribution to the private sector with much higher wage 
inequality, accounts for the bulk of increased earning inequality during transition. 
They also highlight the role that increased social transfers have on limiting increases 
in inequality. Koeninger et al. (2007) show that labor market institutions and policies 
account for much of the change in wage inequality: the authors argue that union 
density, employment protection, tax wedges, levels and duration of benefit replacement 
rates, and the minimum wage all negatively affect the wage differential.
Finally, research also focuses on the relationship between corruption and income 
inequality. Gupta et al. (2002) present arguments which confirm that high and rising 
corruption increases income inequality and poverty through several channels. An 
important implication of their findings is that policies that reduce corruption will 
most likely reduce income inequality and poverty as well. 
3. Methodology and conception of analysis
We employ fixed and random effect panel models given by
Giniit = α + x'
itθ + ∈it,     i = 1, ... , N and t = 1, ... , T  (1)
where Gini ∈(0,1) is the Gini coefficient and the regressors are defined as 
xit = (Taxit, UDit; z  it)′. 
Tax  is  the  various  average  tax  rates,  defined  alternatively  as  total,  social 
contributions, labor, capital, and consumption taxes; and UD is union density. z is 
the vector of country specific control variables
z = (EDUC−3, ln(RGDPPC), Debt−GDP, ln(CPI))′.
where EDUC-3 is a measure of tertiary education; RGDPPC real per capita real 
GDP; Debt-GDP is the debt-to-GDP ratio; and CPI is the Corruption Perception 
Index, details below. a is a scalar
The error term can be decomposed as ∈it = μi + uit where mi is a time invariant 
unobservable country specific effect and uit is the composite error term. Equation (1) 
nests the two standard panel models used. If mi is fixed for each of the N countries, 
with the orthogonality condition E(μi∈it) = 0, and a = 0, equation (1) is a fixed 
effect model. On the other hand, if mi is random with μi ~ iid(0, σ2
μ), E(μixit) = 0, and Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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α ≠ 0 equation (1) is the random effects model. The term E(μixit) = 0 represents the 
orthogonality condition that the fixed effects and regressors are uncorrelated.
Ex-ante we anticipate that estimated coefficients on taxes, particularly labor, social 
contributions, and, hence, total taxes, to be negative because of the redistributive 
effects  of  taxes.  On  the  other  hand,  lower  capital  taxes  are  likely  to  worsen 
income  inequality  and  hence  have  a  positive  estimated  coefficient.  Given  that 
VAT is levied on consumption the impacts on inequality are likely to ambiguous. 
The redistributive effects of increased union membership should improve income 
equality, see Burniaux et al. (2006) and Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa, (2005). 
For the control variables, positive relationships are likely to exist for education 
and, possibly per capita real GDP. The size of the government, proxied by the debt-
to-GDP ratio is ambiguous as this elasticity depends on the nature of government 
spending. Because debt accumulates because of either government consumption 
and/or transfer payments higher debt could be the result of redistribution, which 
would ameliorate inequality, or expenditures, might have a negligible impact. In a 
subsample of our countries, there is a potentially close association to the debt-to-
GDP ratio to corruption. The CPI index accounts for this, because a higher score 
reflects a lower level of perceived corruption will improve inequality yielding a 
negative estimated coefficient.
3.1. The role of taxes and social contributions in reducing income inequality
Tax  policy  can  play  a  major  role  in  making  post-tax  income  distribution  more 
equal. In addition, taxes are the most important and abundant public revenue. Taxes 
and social contributions finance public expenditures on pensions, social security 
system, health, education and provide potential economic protection to citizens. A 
widespread view is that progressive taxation of income is one of the main ways for 
governments to distribute income. Since World War II tax policy has become one of 
major instruments in achieving social and economic policy goals. 
The goal of every modern tax system is efficiency, that is a system that harmonizes 
the  effects  and  goals  of  tax  policy.  But  this  is  difficult  to  achieve  because  of 
unforeseen  incentives  and  externalities  associated  with  tax  policy  choices. 
Therefore, it is not sufficient to know if taxes are regressive or progressive, but 
also how they affect behavior. For example, raising the value added tax (VAT) rate 
leads to regressive consumption taxes. But this negative effect can be mitigated by 
using progressive tax rates of personal income taxes, or transfer payments to low 
income households. Or regressive the effects of consumption taxes can be reduced 
by lowering VAT rates on staples.4
4  Goods and services subject to reduced or 0% VAT rate are similar in the EU15 and the EU12 and like 
in the Croatia are connected with exemption of foods, drugs, newspapers etc.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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Cnossen (1992) argues that although more tax rates in the VAT system can satisfy 
politicians it is an administratively inadequate, non-sustainable, and complicated 
method  for  reducing  tax  burden  for  low  income  families.  It  is  still  politically 
very  popular  to  use  reduced  VAT  tax  rates  regardless  of  their  proven  relative 
ineffectiveness.
The  tax  systems  of  EU  member  states  are  quite  different  and  were  largely 
introduced  when  the  economies  were  relatively closed.5 We  can  divide  the  EU 
member states into two sub-samples. One is consistent with so called old European 
member states or EU15 and the other from EU13.6
Tax systems in the EU15 member states are relatively well established and less 
adept  to  changes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  EU13  member  states  are  required  to 
change their tax systems due to the transition process and accession to the EU and, 
generally,  have  more  homogeneous  tax  systems.7 Among  the  EU15  interesting 
differences still exist. In the Nordic countries8 the largest tax burdens are direct 
taxes, while Greece and Portugal use more indirect taxes. Denmark finances the 
majority of the social safety net with direct taxes and not through social insurance 
contributions. In Germany and France there is a considerable burden from social 
contributions. Overall, tax-to-GDP ratios are generally significantly higher in the 
EU15 member states than in the EU13 member states. 
The  tax  systems  in  the  EU  new  member  states  are  more  transparent  and  less 
complicated, though not necessarily more efficient. The difference between them 
is also visible in shares of revenues from different type of taxes. EU15 economies 
raise roughly equal shares of revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social 
contributions while the EU13 member states display a lower share of direct taxes in 
total.9
Some EU13 economies have adopted a flat tax rate system and collect less revenue 
from direct taxes, because of lower direct tax rates.10 While the overall tax levels 
are lower in the EU13 member states, this may not apply to labor taxation, in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic implicit tax rates are well above the EU average. 
5  Those are primarily the tax systems of the EU15.
6  The EU15 include: Belgium, Germany, France, Luxemburg and Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
The EU13 include: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia.
7  Transition economies have departed from pure income-based or consumption-based orientation of 
tax systems.
8  Denmark, Sweden and Finland.
9  This not the case in Malta.
10 In 2011 the lowest shares of direct taxes (Eurostat, 2013) were in Lithuania (only 17% of the total, 
markedly down from 31% in 2008), Bulgaria (18.9% of the total), Hungary (18.7%) and Slovakia 
(19.1%).Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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Croatia, which gained accession to the European Union in 2013, shares some above 
mentioned characteristics of other EU13 tax systems, but has some idiosyncrasies. 
One of them is the large share of consumption taxes in total taxes and tax treatment 
of capital income which is in general a little more favorable than in other transition 
countries. In addition, tax systems in the EU13 are relatively unstable as these 
economies made changes in response to the recent economic crises.
Answering the question what is the cause of income inequality and how is it related 
to tax policies can be complicated. Although, progressive income taxation typically 
ameliorates  inequality  it  can  also  have  unintended  consequences,  particularly 
if taxes are highly progressive. If governments raises income tax rates for upper 
incomes individuals may respond by taking steps to reduce their taxable income. 
That  can  be  achieved  either  by  substituting  work  for  leisure11  (productivity 
response)  or  through  tax  avoidance.12  Thus  such  policies  may  worsen  income 
distribution.
3.2. The role of labor market institutions and education in reducing income 
inequality
The  rise  in  wage  inequality  since  the  1980s  coincided  with  more  moderate 
labor market institutions and policies, such as trade unions and minimum wage 
laws. It has been argued that the declining role of labor institutions and policies 
have  significantly  reduced  the  government’s  ability  to  redistribute  income  thus 
exacerbating  distribution.  Recent  studies  confirm  the  influence  of  labor  market 
institutions and policies has declined over time in many OECD countries (OECD, 
2011: 99). The current economic crisis also shows that increased unemployment 
is one of the major sources of inequality and labor market policies are a potential 
instrument for reducing inequality: “Unemployment – the inability of the market to 
generate jobs for so many citizens – is the worst failure of the market, the greatest 
source of inefficiency, and a major cause of inequality” (Stiglitz, 2012: xii).
Over  the  sample  period  trade  union  density  rates,  defined  as  the  percentage 
of  workers  who  are  union  members,  have  fallen  across  the  majority  of  the 
sample countries. There are number of reasons for the decline in union density 
in  new  and  old  EU  member  states.  The  trend  of  union  decline  is  a  result  of 
numerous factors: An unfavorable political environment; managerial opposition; 
employees’ career loyalty instead of loyalty to collective aims; union leader in-
fighting;  deindustrialization;  the  rise  of  the  less  unionized  service  sectors;  high 
unemployment; and the growing number of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
see  Obadić  and  Pološki  Vokić  (2012).  Union  membership  does  not  adequately 
11 Such as more vacation time or retirement.
12 This is a case of tax evasion.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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capture the bargaining coverage – an issue particularly important in France and 
Spain where the density is relatively low (around 7-8% in 2010), but the bargaining 
power is strong (more than 90% of workers are covered with collective agreements). 
In Croatia, union membership in 2010 was 34.7% and the proportion of collective 
agreements significantly over EU average (61%). This can be considered relatively 
satisfactory since it is significantly above the average of the EU13 and because 
collective  bargaining  as  it  exists  today  in  the  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe were unknown before year 1989 (Obadić, 2012: 118-120).
In Sweden, the recent rise in income inequality is associated with declining trade 
union membership beginning in the early 1990s and particularly since 2006 (OECD, 
2011: 102). As Noah (2012) emphasizes, the rise of inequality has coincided with a 
dramatic decline in the power of organized labor. Union membership in the United 
States reached its historic peak in 1979 at about 21 percent of the workforce, but 
currently it represents about 12 percent. Although the chief purpose of a union 
is  to  maximize  the  income  of  its  members,  one  might  think  that  higher  union 
membership would increase income inequality. But Freeman (1980) demonstrated 
that union’s ability to reduce income disparities among members outweighed other 
factors, and therefore their net effect was to reduce income inequality, see Noah 
(2012). 
In relative terms, total expenditure for labor market policies in EU member states 
represents just fewer than 2% of GDP of member states (excluding Greece). The 
highest relative level of expenditure in 2011 was reported in Belgium and Denmark 
(both 3.7 % of GDP), followed by Ireland and Spain (both 3.6% of GDP) – the 
only other EU member states to spend more than 3% of their GDP on such policies. 
Conversely, ten member states spent less than 1% of GDP on LMP: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the 
United Kingdom, and Croatia are about 0.5% of GDP (Eurostat, 2013). Generally, 
EU13 countries rank at the bottom of LMP spending (as a share of GDP) compared 
to EU15 countries.
Policy and institutional reforms contribute to widening wage disparities, as low 
skill workers enter the labor market and highly skilled benefit from a more dynamic 
economy.  Decreasing  benefit  replacement  rates  for  low-wage  workers  increase 
up  wage  dispersion  –  lower  replacement  rates  mean  lower  reservation  wages 
(OECD, 2011: 31). It has been hypothesized that high replacement rates would 
strengthen the bargaining position of lower-paid workers more than that of higher-
paid workers, and hence would lower the wage differential. Higher unemployment 
insurance replacement rates are negatively associated with wage dispersion (OECD, 
2011: 104-119).
Vanhoudt (1997) analyzes the impact of labor market policies on income inequality 
in member states of OECD. He finds that the Gini coefficient is not affected by Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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labor market policies, although other measures of inequality are. Specifically, he 
finds that active labor market policies – such as expenditures for public employment 
services, labor market training and subsidized employment – improve the income 
share  of  the  bottom  quintiles  of  the  population  and  reduce  the  income  gap 
between the top and bottom quintiles. Passive labor market policies (for example, 
compensation schemes) have a minor impact.
Countries with high graduation rates at the tertiary level are also those most likely 
to develop or maintain a highly skilled labor force. The emerging knowledge-based 
information economy requires a large supply of highly skilled people, particularly 
for tertiary graduates – especially in the fields of science and engineering. It should 
be noted that union membership and education are generally negatively correlated. 
However,  education  and  union  membership  in  the  public  sector  are  positively 
correlated in Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Poland, 
the U.S. and the UK (Blanchflower, 2006). Most commonly, the most qualified and 
many low-skilled unemployed are not in union, so the membership is concentrated 
around medium-skilled jobs.
Economists have put forward alternative reasons for the rise in income inequality 
in  developed  and  developing  countries  since  1970s.  Some  support  the  “new 
technologies”  arguments  which  states  that  new  technologies  put  premium  on 
skills associated with higher education, for example Murphy and Welch (1989). 
Skill wage premia have risen rapidly in the past generation exacerbating income 
distribution. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) and Zhang 
(1996) develop models where continued support for public education lowers the 
level of income inequality over time. However, Jimenez (1986) argues that many 
public education expenditures do not benefit the poor at all and, hence, do not 
reduce income inequality, as does Fields (1989). 
Ram  (1989)  reviews  previous  theoretical  and  empirical  research  and  concludes 
there  is  not  strong  support  for  increasing  education  lowers  income  inequality. 
Carnoy et al. (2012) examine various aspects of the complex relationship between 
higher education expansion and income inequality in developing countries (BRIC 
countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China). They results show that mass higher 
education expansion did not appear to have decreased income inequality. In fact, 
their  analysis  suggests  that  higher  education  expansion  contributed  to  greater 
inequality in China.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 1 • 121-140  131
4. Empirical data and analysis
4.1. Empirical data
The sample analyzed is for the 28 EU economies, the “core” fifteen predominately 
western economies and the thirteen newly admitted Central and Eastern European 
economies using annual data from 2000–2011. We use the Gini coefficient as the 
measure of income inequality, which is between 0 and 1. The overall tax burden is 
the sum of four components:
  – Social contributions (hereafter “social” taxes), includes include both compulsory 
and voluntary social contributions;
  – Labor (earned income), taxes on wage and/or salary income, includes social 
contributions;
  – Capital, taxes on business income; and 
  – Consumption (VAT), taxes levied on final consumption;
all are measured as percentage of GDP. To measure the impacts of labor institutions 
we use union density (UD) which is the percentage of union membership to all 
wage and salary earners, from Visser (2014). 
Control variables include the percentage of 30-34 year olds who have completed a 
tertiary (university) level of education (EDUC−3) per capital real GDP (PCRGDP) 
in euro; and the debt-to-GDP ratio (Debt-GDP), to measure the size of government 
expenditure.  To  account  for  the  distributive  effects  of  corruption,  we  use  the 
Corruption  Perceptions  Index  (CPI)  from  Transparency  International  which  is 
between 0 and 10 with 10 being the least corrupt.
4.2. Descriptive statitics and empirical analysis
Table  1  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample  period. The  total  number 
of observations, overall panel mean,   ; the standard deviation, and the
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N × T Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gini 286 29.292 4.001 22.00 38.90
Taxes
Total  335 36.204 5.992 26.00 51.50
Social Contributions 335 10.933 3.603 1.00 17.10
Labor 336 16.687 5.868 0.40 30.80
Capital 336 6.876 2.662 1.10 14.00
Consumption 336 12.203 1.928 7.30 19.10
UD 233 31.839 19.647 7.10 80.10
EDUC−3 330 19.903 7.043 4.90 35.30
ln(PCRGDP) 336 9.648 0.783 7.70 11.16
Debt-GDP 335 50.492 28.440 3.70 170.30
ln(CPI) 329 1.783 0.331 0.96 2.30
Source: Authors
Concentrating  first  on  taxes  see  that,  on  average,  the  largest  share  of  taxes  is 
generated by labor income with 16.7% of GDP, the smallest is on capital at about 
6.9% of GDP. Over the sample period, these percentages remain more or less the 
same. Overall taxes vary from a low of 26% of GDP to a high of 51.1%. Somewhat 
surprising is the difference in the union density rate, while the average percentage 
of wage earners is 32%, the low is 7.1% and the high of 80%. Turning our attention 
to the percentage of adults with a tertiary education is 32% with a low of 4.9% and 
a max of 35%. 
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Results
We began our analysis by conducting Breusch-Pagan random effect tests under 
the null that variance of the errors of OLS regressions with time fixed effects are 
constant across the N countries. We soundly rejected the null σ2
u,i = σ2
u,j ∀ i ≠ j   
economies and conclude that panel models are appropriate.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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Table 2: Random effects model – dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Variables
Total
Social 
Contributions
Labor Capital Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax -0.257*** -0.493*** -0.406*** 0.101 -0.036
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.424) (0.847)
UD -0.036 -0.092*** -0.024 -0.067** -0.067**
(0.192) (0.000) (0.374) (0.018) (0.020)
EDUC−3 0.931 0.695 1.131 1.014 0.921
(0.286) (0.415) (0.188) (0.277) (0.324)
ln(PCRGDP) 1.262 0.346 0.895 0.362 0.651
(0.214) (0.720) (0.366) (0.755) (0.560)
Debt-GDP -0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.008
(0.402) (0.740) (0.884) (0.595) (0.436)
CPI -3.716** -4.313*** -3.598** -4.274*** -4.271***
(0.016) (0.004) (0.017) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant 31.77*** 39.81*** 31.39*** 31.97 30.65***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.001)
pW (Tax-UD) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.061
Hausman 0.231 0.380 0.109 0.734 0.802
Sargan-Hansen 0.225 0.378 0.100 0.741 0.808
R2
O 0.362 0.472 0.447 0.281 0.256
T × N 199 199 199 199 199
Notes:  p-values in parenthesis,  ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. pW (Tax-UD) is the p-value on a Wald jointly testing Tax = UD = 0. 
The Hausman statistic is the p-value of a χ2(5) test and the Sargan-Hansen statistic is the 
p-value of a Wald test for over identified orthogonality restrictions. R2
O is the overall R2. 
OLS results are available on request.
Source: Authors
Results of the random and fixed effects models are in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. 
Columns  (1)  –  (5)  represent  different  model  specifications  and  is  dependent 
on  which  tax  rate  is  used:  total  taxes  (1),  social  (2),  labor  (3),  capital  (4),  or 
consumption  (5)  respectively.  p-values  are  in  parenthesis,  stars  are  used  as 
standard to denote statistical significance. Wald tests are conducted to jointly test 
Tax = Union Density = 0, p-values of these tests are denoted as pW (Tax-UD). We 
also present the overall-R2 and the number of observations, T×N.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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Table 3: Results fixed effects model –dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Variables
Total
Social 
Contributions
Labor Capital Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax - 0.246*** -0.454*** -0.593*** 0.040 -0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.768) (0.987)
UD -0.023 -0.045 -0.010 -0.047 -0.046
(0.657) (0.387) (0.850) (0.374) (0.384)
EDUC−3 1.165 1.158 1.428 0.903 0.896
(0.305) (0.308) (0.196) (0.435) (0.439)
PCRGDP 1.257 0.706 0.175 1.070 1.179
(0.510) (0.712) (0.925) (0.589) (0.547)
Debt-GDP -0.015 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.010
(0.172) (0.658) (0.808) (0.449) (0.371)
CPI -3.998** -4.373*** -4.756*** -4.365*** -4.349**
(0.017) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant 31.37* 33.57* 43.37** 25.45 24.78
(0.088) (0.069) (0.017) (0.173) (0.189)
pW (Tax-UD) 0.021 0.019 0.000 0.655 0.684
R2
O 0.325 0.354 0.416 0.257 0.240
T × N 199 199 199 199 199
Notes: p-values in parenthesis,  ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. pW (Tax-UD) is the p-value on a Wald jointly testing Tax = UD = 0. 
R2
O is the overall R2.
Source: Authors
In Table 2 we also provide the results of two tests which are used to determine 
which of the panel regressions is the “best” model: the Hausman efficient estimator 
and the Sargan-Hansen overidentifying tests. While these tests are not specifically 
intended to test for the appropriate panel model, low estimated p-values, at, say, 
p ≤ 5%, are generally interpreted as a rejection of the random effects model (See 
Baltagi,  2013:  24-25). And  p-values  for  the  Hausman  and  Sargan-Hansen  tests 
favor the random effects model. Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions... 
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5.2. Discussion
Turning  our  attention  to  the  estimates  we  see  that  the  overall,  labor,  social 
contributions and labor taxes are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Consumption taxes have a negligible negative impact inequality. As hypothesized, 
higher  capital  rates  exacerbate  inequality,  but  estimates  are  not  significant.  The 
estimates are consistent across the two models. The largest tax elasticity, in absolute 
value, in the random effects model is for social contributions while for the panel 
model it is labor taxes. Estimated coefficients for union density, UD, are all negative, 
as posited.13 However, the estimates are significant only in the random effects model 
and when matched with social, capital, and consumption taxes.
Notably, while the estimated coefficients for education are of the correct sign, it 
has  no  statistically  significant  impact  on  income  inequality  in  any  of  the  model 
specifications. Similarly, the positive impact of per capita real GDP is not statistically 
significant.  Nor  is  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and  while  the  estimates  are  generally 
negative,  the  estimated  coefficients  are  effectively  equal  to  zero.  Finally,  less 
corruption is a strong indicator of better income distribution, most of the estimates are 
greater than 4.0 in absolute value and significant at roughly the 1% level. Wald tests 
for the joint restriction Tax = UD = 0 are generally rejected.
The applied fixed and random effect panel models show that the taxes on labor and 
social contributions and falling union membership are associated with an increase 
in inequality. And that’s what labor organizing is like three decades into the Great 
Divergence as Noah (2012) concluded. Our results show that tertiary education does 
not impact income inequality, but results are informative. Using OLS with time 
fixed effects, education are statistically significant with positive sign, but not with 
the panel models. Such results correspond with those of Ram (1989) who concludes 
that  there  is  not  strong  support  that  increasing  education  within  the  population 
lowers income inequality and Carnoy, et al. (2012) who find that investing in higher 
education did not appear to reduce income inequality.
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to identify the effects of tax policies and labor market 
institutions on income inequality across EU member states with emphasis on the 
Croatia economy. The paper includes theoretical background, comparison of present 
differences among the taxation systems of the EU member states, and advantages 
and disadvantages of different types of taxes and labor market institutions. We 
13 We also experimented with the three definitions of labor market policy (LMP) interventions as 
defined in Visser (2014), LMP total categories 1-9, LMP categories 2-7, and LMP categories 8-9. 
Only LMP categories 2-7 (or labor market measures – active labor market policies) were statistically   
significant and were similar to the results for union density.Alka Obadić et al. • The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions...   
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use panel analysis and conclude that participation in trade unions and tax policies 
reduce  income  inequality  in  EU-15  and  EU-13  countries  in  2000–2011  period, 
which proves our initial hypothesis. This research provides new evidence using a 
cross section of established EU and new EU entrant countries on the impacts of 
tax policy and labor market institutions on income inquality. We show that taxes, 
particularly  labor,  social  contribution,  and  overall  taxes  do  ameliorate  income 
inequality  in  the  sample  countries.  Moreover,  union  membership  contributes  to 
reductions in income inequality when a random effects model is used. Interestingly, 
tertiary education has no statistically significant impact on inequality in our results. 
Perhaps predictably, rising corruption exacerbates inequality. Whereas taxes and 
transfers have significant redistributive impact and this development affect income 
inequality and depend on the type of tax implanted. Social security contributions 
and consumption taxes tend to be regressive in Croatia and in most countries and 
due to reductions related to capital taxation the redistributive impact of those taxes 
has also been reduced. It should be noted there is still an education “puzzle” that 
needs to be solved. We did not experience a lot of problems or limitations during 
our  investigation,  however  a  concern  lack  of  observations  overtime.  Given  the 
dynamic processes in labor markets, particularly with repsect to economy wide 
structural changes, our sample may be unable to pick longer term shifts in economic 
fundamentals. An  additional  factor  which  could  influence  income  inequality  is 
membership in the EU. Entry to the EU requires a number of structural changes 
which  must  be  met  before  accession. Therefore,  guidelines  for  further  research 
should involve using the Difference-in-Differences approach to analyse the impacts 
of accession to the EU on income inequality. We recommend that economic policy 
makers take income inequality into consideration when designing tax and labor 
market reforms. Tax policies must be perceived to be equitable to maintain social 
cohesion. To decrease income inequality in labor market the new member states 
should invest more in specially targeted to improving coordination between parties 
in collective bargaining. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that investing more in 
higher education will not decrease income inequality, though this is an avenue for 
further investigation. We believe that progressive taxes reduce income inequalities 
and improving human capital will bring about a lessening of income inequality if 
used effectively.
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Učinci porezne politike i institucija tržišta rada na dohodovne nejednakosti
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Cilj ovog rada bio je istražiti kako institucije i regulativa na tržištu rada te porezna 
politika  utječu  na  dohodovne  nejednakosti  zemalja  članica  Europske  unije. 
Istraživanje je provedeno na uzorku koji se sastojao od starih zemalja članica 
(EU15) i novih zemalja članica (EU13) Unije. Modeliranje je izvršeno uporabom 
panela sa fiksnim i slučajnim efektima za vremensko razdoblje od 2000.–2011. 
godine, a kako bi se testirao upliv triju temeljnih grupa poreza (kojima opo  re  zujemo 
rad, kapital i potrošnju), socijalnih doprinosa i institucija tržišta rada. U radu je 
dokazano  kako  socijalni  doprinosi  i  oporezivanje  rada  dovode  do  statistički 
značajnih  poboljšanja  povezanih  uz  dohodovne  nejednakosti  među  zemljama 
članicama EU što dovodi do zaključka, kako porezna politika, osobito izbor po  rez  nog 
oblika,  kao  i  institucije  tržišta  rada,  osobito  članstvo  u  sindikatima,  sma  njuju 
dohodovne nejednakosti u EU28 u promatranom razdoblju. 
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